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We present an empirical study of loss aversion in the Hong Kong horse betting market. We 
provide evidence of the presence of loss aversion in a context of complete absence of the favourite-
longshot  bias.  This  would  suggest  that,  since  loss  aversion  is  a  psychological  bias,  the  favourite-
longshot bias may not necessarily be caused by psychological issues and may be due, for instance, to 
informational  asymmetry.  We  investigate  different  types  of  bettors  and  their  attitude  towards  loss 
aversion.  Our  data  set  enables  us  to  distinguish  approximately  among  insiders,  unsophisticated 
outsiders and sophisticated outsiders. The results show clearly that even sophisticated bettors are beset 
by loss aversion, while even unsophisticated outsiders display no favourite-longshot bias. Thus, our 
paper provides evidence that loss aversion may be an attitude innate rather than learned, regardless of 
the level of sophistication in designing economic behaviour or the extent of information asymmetry. 
Chen et al (2006) show that capuchin monkeys display biases when faced with gambles, including loss 
aversion, and provide evidence that loss aversion extends beyond humans. The present work supports 
the idea that loss aversion may be a more universal bias, arising regardless of experience and culture 
and demonstrates that loss aversion is displayed even by those bettors regarded in the market as “smart 
money”. Further, we find that more sophisticated and experienced bettors display a higher level of loss 
aversion.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Haigh  and  List  (2005),  who  show  that 
professional traders in financial markets exhibit more loss aversion than do students.  
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1. Introduction  
Is loss aversion acquired or innate in traders? Are expert traders more or less susceptible to loss 
aversion  than  amateurs?  Is  the  favourite-longshot  bias  a  psychological  bias  or  is  it,  perhaps,  a 
consequence of asymmetric information in the markets in which it is observed? These are among the 
important questions in contemporary behavioural finance. Our purpose in this paper is to shed some 
light on these questions by conducting an empirical study of the Hong Kong horse betting market. This 
market is characterized by very high turnovers and a parimutuel-only betting system. It is thus a market 
of sufficient size to proxy other types of financial market while, permitting the evaluation of some 
aspects of these questions via asset prices determined solely by demand
3. 
Horse  betting  markets  are  very  good  natural  experiment  candidates  to  test  theories  of 
preferences under risk: they allow for the collection of large datasets, and the average amount of money 
at stake is significant
4. Racetrack studies may provide key insights for the analysis of risk -taking 
behaviour in other financial markets as well as in other contexts where risk is the key issue. Betting 
markets  have  the  advantage  of  being  short -run,  lasting  for  one  period  only;  this  facilitates  the 
calculation of the  precise ex-post return on each bet.  A win  bet  may  be interpreted as an Arrow 
security, which provides revenue of (1+ R) dollars in the event the horse wins the race and 0 otherwise. 
R indicates the odds of the horse, defined as the net return contingent upon the backed horse winning 
the race
5. 
In a parimutuel market, odds are endogenous, determined by the distribution of wagers over the 
horses: the odds of horse i are the ratio of total money B wagered on the race net of the track revenue 
(including the take, i.e. the percentage of bets collected by racetrack organizers and the taxes, and the 
breakage, equal to the return loss due to rounding the return to  the nearest monetary unit) and total 
money Bi wagered on horse i.  
We investigate the presence of loss aversion in the context of the Hong Kong horse betting 
market, for which we first show that there is no favourite-longshot bias. This constitutes one of the 
points of major interest of the paper since loss aversion – in one guise or another - has been used 
widely in the literature on betting markets in order to explain the presence of a favourite-longshot bias. 
This paper provides evidence of the presence of loss aversion in a context of complete absence of the 
favourite-longshot  bias.  This  would  suggest  that,  since  loss  aversion  is  a  psychological  bias,  the 
favourite-longshot bias may not necessarily be caused by psychological issues and may be due, for 
instance, to informational asymmetry
6. 
As distinct from Jullien and Salanie (2000),  we do not perform a calibration exercise of the 
utility function type on the data .  Rather, we implement a simple direct test for the presence of loss 
aversion on the betting price, based on the definition of loss aversion. Thus, in the presence of loss 
aversion, bettors would increase the winning price (reduce the winning odds) of   a  horse whose 
performance they expect to improve at its next start, by less that they would redu ce its price if they 
expected a decrease in performance of equal measure. We show that  bettors exhibit a degree of loss 
aversion which is consistent with the empirical  findings of Kahneman and Tversky: bettors weigh a 
loss from 2 up to 3 times an equivalent expected gain.   
                                                 
3 In a parimutuel only market, the supplier (tote) is not an active goal oriented economic agent merely setting a take-out rate 
which guarantees it a profit. Prices are thus determined exclusively on the demand side. 
4 This is particularly true in the case of Hong Kong. The annual revenue of the Hong Kong Jockey Club, which controls the 
betting market, was around $HK82 billion in 2000, roughly equal to that of the Tel Aviv Stock exchange at the time. 
Typically, there is over $US 1 million in the win pool for every race. 
 
5 In this paper, we are concerned exclusively with the win betting market. 
6 See Schnytzer, Shilony and Thorne (2003) for an explanation along these lines.   3 
As shown in Schnytzer and Shilony (1995), bettors with different levels of information have 
different betting strategies and are able to obtain different profit levels. Traditionally, economic theory 
has regarded bettors with higher levels of information as more rational. However, less attention has 
been devoted to investigate how widespread loss aversion, specifically, is. We investigate different 
types of bettors and their attitude towards loss aversion. In other words, we aim to understand whether 
bettors who can access different information sets and employ different levels of sophistication in their 
betting strategies, all display loss aversion and, if so, whether they do so to the same extent. Our data 
set permits us to distinguish approximately among insiders, unsophisticated outsiders and sophisticated 
outsiders, at least insofar as the information is imbedded in the odds data at different times during the 
betting. Our results show clearly that even sophisticated bettors are beset by loss aversion. We thereby 
provide evidence that loss aversion may be an innate rather than a learned attitude, regardless of the 
level of sophistication in designing economic behaviour or the extent of information asymmetry. Chen 
et al (2006) show that capuchin monkeys display biases when faced with gambles, including loss 
aversion, and provide evidence that loss aversion extends beyond humans. The present work supports 
the idea that loss aversion may be a more universal bias, arising regardless of experience and culture 
and demonstrates that loss aversion is displayed even by those bettors regarded in the market as “smart 
money”.  
Indeed, we find that more sophisticated and experienced bettors display a higher level of loss 
aversion than "amateurs". This result is consistent with the findings of Haigh and List (2005), who 
show that professional traders in financial markets exhibit more loss aversion than do students. This 
result is particularly interesting in light of the discussion as to whether loss aversion is limited to those 
agents  who  are  inexperienced  with  markets.  The  evidence  is  not  unambiguous  on  the  topic:  for 
example, Camerer et al. (1997) find that loss aversion in limited to less experienced subjects in a field 
study of New York taxi drivers.  
Hong Kong has only two race tracks: Sha Tin and Happy Valley. Since our dataset includes 
nearly all the win bets at both tracks over a number of seasons, the empirical test on loss aversion is 
performed on the entire population of horse bettors in Hong Kong.  
These tracks are, however, rather different. In particular, Happy Valley is a more difficult track than 
Sha Tin
7. Both tracks are oval circuits and the track configuration suggests that those horses with 
barrier-positions on the inside of the track will be favoured, since, ceteris paribus, they will be required 
to run less distance. HV has a circumference of only 1454 meters whereas the circumference of ST is 
1933 meters. The bends at HV are therefore tighter than those at ST; the tightest bend at HV having a 
radius of only 91 meters, whereas the equivalent bend at ST has a radius of 158 meters. Consequently, 
the configuration of these tracks suggests that horses with a low barrier-position will be favoured more 
at HV. This means that when measuring the extent of loss aversion, it is important to control for barrier 
positions of the horses (as well as, obviously, other control variables such as weight carried and so on). 
We find that loss aversion is present in different degrees at the two tracks: at Happy Valley - the more 
difficult track - there is less loss aversion for all kinds of bettors. The evidence indicates that even if 
loss aversion is innate in human beings, the type of economic context is relevant in determining its 
overall intensity.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present an overview of the related 
literature, both in horse betting markets and in the alternative frameworks of standard expected utility. 
In Section 3 we provide the theoretical analysis underlying our empirical analysis. In section 4 the main 
empirical results are presented and discussed and Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
7 There is a broad consensus among horse bettors in Hong Kong that Happy Valley is a far more difficult for both horses 
and bettors than Sha Tin.   4 
2. Related literature 
  A major literature branch relevant to the present paper examines alternative frameworks to the 
expected  utility  model  of  behaviour  under  uncertainty.  Experimental  research  into  choice  under 
uncertainty has revealed that people behave in ways that systematically violate the set of basic axioms 
formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and Savage (1954), upon which the conventional 
expected  utility  theory  is  built.  In  particular,  the  empirical  evidence  presented  by  Kahneman  and 
Tversky (1979) and others shows a number of patterns of choice that reveal behavioural regularities 
that systematically contradict the predictions of conventional expected utility theory. Following the 
discovery of the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, many attempts have been made to develop alternative 
frameworks for the analysis of choice under uncertainty, consistent with the observed behavioural 
regularities
8.  A  subset  starts  from  an  attempt  at  a  psychological  explanation  of  Allais  Paradox 
phenomenon.  One  of  t he  earliest  was  Prospect  T heory  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979),  later 
generalized  to  cumulative  prospect  theory  (1992).   A  central  featu re  of  Prospect  Theory  is  t he 
incorporation of  the idea that people care about changes in financial wealth  –  i.e.  they  utilize  a 
reference point when evaluating an uncertain prospect - and they exhibit loss aversion over wealth 
changes, i.e. the decrease in utility associated with a loss is greater than the increase in utility level 
associated with a gain of equal size. 
  Two more intuitive and parsimonious psychologically based theories are regret theory (Sugden 
and  Loomes,  1982,  1987)  and  disappointment  theory  (Sugden  and  Loomes,  1986);  both  of  which 
incorporate  ex  ante  considerations  of  ex  post  psychological  feelings:  of  regret  or  rejoicing,  in  the 
former and of disappointment or elation, in the latter.  
 
"The  fundamental  idea  behind  regret  theory  is  that  the  psychological  experience  of  "having  x"  can  be  influenced  by 
comparison between x and y that one might have had, had one chosen differently. If, for example, I bet on a horse which 
fails to win, I may experience something more than a reduction in my wealth: I may also experience a painful sense of 
regret arising out of the comparison between my current state of wealth and the state that I would have enjoyed, had I not 
bet" (Sugden, 1991). 
 
  A number of empirical studies investigate the importance of non-expected utility theory and the 
role of loss aversion in different economic settings. In racetrack betting, Jullien and Salanié (2000) 
offer an alternative explanation of the favourite-longshot bias
9 that affects pari-mutuel betting markets. 
They compare expected utility and prospect theory in pari-mutuel betting on horse races. Using a ten-
year  sample  of  flat  races  run  in  England,  they  assume  that  bettors  value  bets  according  to  either 
expected-utility  theory,  rank-dependent  utility  theory  or  cumulative  prospect  theory  and  infer  the 
parameters  of  bettor’s  utility  and  probability weighting  functions  from  the  marginal  bettor  who  is 
indifferent among bets on all horses at the odds established when the race is run. Jullien and Salanié 
show that cumulative prospect theory fits the data better than expected utility theory or rank-dependent 
theory. Further, they show that the weighting function for losses severely overweighs low probability 
of loss, while the one for gains is roughly linear. These findings offer a different explanation for the 
favourite-longshot bias: bettors who like to gamble (u(x) is convex) are heavily afraid of losing in the 
case of bets on favourites with small loss probability, while this is not the case for longshots with a 
                                                 
8 See Camerer (2004) for a detailed review on Prospect Theory and Starmer (2004) for detailed references on Non-Expected 
Utility Theory. 
9 The favourite-longshot bias identifies the phenomenon according to which bettors tend to over-bet “longshots” (i.e. horses 
with a relatively small probability of winning) and under-bet favourites. In other words, within the context of a parimutuel 
betting system, the percentage of money bet on longshots is much higher than the fraction of winning horses within the class 
formed according to the percentage of money bet on them. See, for example, Thaler and Ziemba (1988) and Hausch and 
Ziemba (1995) for analyses of this bias.   5 
high probability of loss. Bradley (2002) assumes an agent maximising expected utility with a reference 
point (the case of no bet) and an asymmetric treatment for gains and losses incorporated under the 
hypothesis of a different constant relative risk aversion utility function for losses and gains. The author 
obtains  a  better  fit  of  the  data  than  Jullien  and  Salanié,  enabling  an  alternative  explanation  the 
favourite-longshot bias. 
 
3. The betting market  
 
We present a concise model of a tote betting market where the bet price is characterised under a 
non-expected utility framework. 
We assume that the agent’s preferences are described by the following utility function (Loomes 
and Sugden, 1986): 
(1)      i ij ij ij x x D x x U     
where  ij x  denotes the payoff of betting on horse i in race j and  i x  denotes the expected payoff of horse 
i. 
According  to  this  utility  function,  the  economic  agent  receives  not  only  the  utility  derived 
directly from the actual consequence of an uncertain prospect, but in addition feels some degree of 
disappointment or elation. When the agent evaluates a prospect, he forms an a priori expectation about 
any uncertain prospect and after the uncertainty is resolved, he compares the actual consequence of the 
prospect  with  the  a  priori  expectation.  If  the  actual  consequence  turns  out  to  be  worse  than  the 
expectation, he feels disappointment. On the other hand, the individual experiences some degree of 
elation if the actual consequence is better than the a priori expectation. 
We assume the following functional form for the disappointment-elation component of the 
utility function,   D : 
 


















    (3)                                                                            l g     
According to assumption (2), the utility function is defined on deviations from the reference 
point, i.e. the utility function is kinked at the origin. The parameter  l g i i , ,    captures the intensity of 
loss (= disappointment) aversion and we require the utility function to be steeper for losses than for 
gains, as given by assumption (3). This characteristic reflects a salient feature of attitudes to changes in 
welfare, that is, the disappointment associated with a loss with respect to the expected result appears to 
be greater than the pleasure associated with an equal-sized gain. This specification of the    D  function 
captures  the  attitude  of  loss  aversion  in  the  spirit  of the  Kahneman-Tversky  descriptive  theory  of 
decision-making under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
The choice of this utility function allows us to investigate the effect of a psychological attitude 
such as loss aversion in the betting market. Since we are investigating the betting market, we do not 
endow the agent with any legacy or other forms of wealth inherited from the past. The reference point 
is represented by the expected payoff from betting on a specific horse.  
  We develop a simple and intuitive model to explain the price of a horse in a given race in order 
to test the presence of loss aversion. Let  ij R  be the odds of horse i in race j and  ij p  be the horse’s 
subjective probability of winning of race j. Under the assumption of a linear utility function, the price 
of a horse i for an expected utility maximizer would be:   6 
 




However, in our case, the price equation must be modified to take into account the anticipation 
of disappointment or elation. Thus, under assumptions (1) (2) (3) we derive the modified expected 
utility function as:  
 
     (4)                           i l ij i ij g ij ij R p R R R p j race in i horse of ice        1 1 1 Pr    
 
We derive an appropriate econometric form of equation (4) in the next section. 
 
4. Empirical tests 
 
The data consist of 4258 Hong Kong races in which 54,335 horses took part between the 3
rd of 
September 2000 and the 18
th of October 2006. For each horse i in race j, i=1….Nj, j=1….4258
10, we 
observe the odds for horse i in race j, which are the (net) return on HK$1 placed on that horse, if it 
wins. Further, we observe the final placing of all the horses in each race. We have these data for both 
tracks in Hong Kong: Happy Valley and Sha Tin. 
The data set allows us to observe bet prices at three different time slices: overnight (indicated as 
_00), 5 minutes before race start (indicated as _05) and at the closure of bets (indicate as _fo). The 
prices at different time slices capture different types of bettors. Overnight bets are usually placed by 
people prepared to bet before the day of the race. This suggests that they are outsiders who are not 
expert, otherwise they would have not bet without knowing in what state the horse appears to be, the 
conditions of the track and the weather, etc. It cannot be ruled out that some insiders who wish to bet 
“un-noticed” place bets overnight, but this may be assumed to be a small percentage of the total pool. 
The bet price registered 5 minutes before race start adds to outsiders the bets placed by insiders, who 
have private information. Five minutes before the race most of money is in except for very late bettors, 
whose presence is captured in the closing price: usually they are professionals with very sophisticated 
analysis of public information and, of course, further bets by insiders and normal outsiders. The three 
bet prices indicate the role of a different type of bettor: the overnight price indicates non-expert bettors 
(outsiders) with public information, the price 5 minutes before race start capture the role of insiders 
with private information along with betting by outsiders, and the closing price adds to the pool the 
behaviour of insiders who bet late and professional syndicates with sophisticated analysis techniques. 
  Prior to testing for the presence of loss aversion in the Hong Kong betting market, it must be 
shown that the three set of prices contain different information and that there is no favourite-longshot 
bias implied at the three stages of the betting. That there is different information incorporated in the 
three sets of prices is shown in Table I, where we show the results of running a linear probability 
model, regressing a dummy which receives 1 for race winners and 0 otherwise, on the overnight odds, 
Odds open, the odds five minutes before the race, Odds_05 and final odds, Odds final, respectively, in 
the presence of interactions between all the horses and their jockeys in the sample. The regression in 
Table I shows clearly that the set of information contained by prices at different times during the 
betting period is different, since each of the implied probabilities is significant at 0,1% or better. 
                                                 
10 Note that the number of starters in a race runs from 7 through 14, with most races having 12 or 14 starters. 







The role of different information sets 
 
 
Explanatory Variables   
Odds open  -.0030464*** 
(.0002629) 
Odds_05  .0020522*** 
(.0003918) 
Odds final  -.0047497*** 
(.0003488) 
Observations  54,335 
Adjusted R
2  45.3  
 
Table I: Dependent variable: Win, a dummy which receives 1 for the winning horse in the race and zero otherwise. In 
addition to the explanatory variables shown in the table, the regression also contains horse-jockey interactions. Standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity as required by the linear probability model are reported in parenthesis. *** The 






The second step is to show that there is no favourite-longshot bias in Hong Kong. This is a key 
point since loss aversion is used often to explain why the favourite-longshot bias arises. We present 
results for the aggregate of both tracks, since the results do not differ significantly across tracks
11. We 
divide the data set into 20 groups by each of the three sets of probability equivalents
12 of the overnight 
odds, Prob_00, odds five minutes before the race, Prob_05 and final odds, Prob_fo, respectively, and 
run weighted least squares regressions of winning frequencies on mean probability equivalents for each 
of the three sets of odds for each group. The weights are the numbers of horses in each group. The 
results were as follows: 
 
                                                 
11 Results by track are available upon request. 
12 Since we do not have data on proportions of the pool bet on individual horses, we calculate probability equivalents as 
follows:  Since the Hong Kong tote rounds all payouts down to the nearest 10 cents, we add 5 cents to all (odds+1), take the 









The presence of Favourite-longshot Bias and different types of bettors 
 
 
Variables  Overnight bettors 
Betting 5 minutes 
before race start   
 
Betting at the close 
 
Prob_00  1.024971***   
(.0187403)     
   
Prob_05 
 
|   .9968372***    
(.0127564)  
 
             Prob_fo 
   
    1.000875*** 
(.0122404)    





|   (.0013326)  
Observations   20   20   20  
Adjusted R
2   33549   33593   33599  
Table II: Dependent variable: Win, a dummy which receives 1 for the winning horse in the race and zero otherwise. 
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity as required by the linear probability model are reported in parenthesis.  









In order to test the presence of favourite-longshot bias, we perform an F- test on the joint 
hypothesis: 
 
fo i i prob , 05 , 00 1 _    
Constant = 0 




F-test results for the presence of Favourite -longshot Bias 
 
 
Variables  Overnight bettors 
Betting 5 minutes 
before race start  
 











0.9817                      
 
 
       
It is clear from these results that bettors exhibit no favourite-longshot bias. Note that this result 
holds not only for closing prices, but even for those bettors who bet on the day before the races and five 
minutes before race start. The finding that prices before the close of betting display no statistically 
significant favourite-longshot bias is, to the best of our knowledge, entirely new in the literature on the 
favourite longshot bias. 
 
Since  Shin  (1991,  1992)  a  number  of  papers  have  shown  that  insiders  and  outsiders  have 
different betting strategies, reflecting the role of private information [see among others Schnytzer and 
Shilony  (1995)].  However,  none  has  ever  investigated  whether  different  types  of  agents  reflect  a 
different attitude towards risk.  Here we investigate the loss aversion attitude for the three types of 
bettors. 
According to the model described in the previous section, we design a simple empirical test, 
which consists in testing the hypotheses that  g   and  l    are significantly different and that  g   is lower 
than l  .  However, in equation (4), the deviation,    i ij R R  , of the odds for horse i in race j from the 
expected odds is correlated with the price of horse i in race j, since the price of horse i in race j is 
calculated simply as the inverse of the odds plus one. Accordingly, we need to find an instrumental 
variable that will allow us to test our hypotheses on   g   and l  .  
We define the normalized finishing position
13 of horse i in race j NFPij as: 
 
(4)                                                       
runners of Number
position finishing Ordinal
NFPij  1  
for all horses but the winner and set NFPij = 1 for all winning horses. 
 
                                                 
13 Note that according to the definition used, the variable NFP takes values over the interval [0,1], where the winner gets 1 
and the last horse 0. The definition used differs from the one used by Brecher (1980), according to which NFP takes values 
over the interval [-0.5, 0.5], and the winner gets 0.5 and the last horse -0.5. 
   10 
We use a functional form of the difference between NFP for horse i in races j and race j-1 
(described below) as an instrumental variable for  i ij R R  : it is a measure of whether the bettor’s 
expectations over the winner of the race are satisfied or disappointed, but it is not directly correlated 
with the price of horse i in race j. In order to perform the empirical test on the presence of loss aversion 
and test whether bettors react more to losses than gains, we need to distinguish between horses that 
improve their finishing positions and those that do not, in a sense that is meaningful in terms of win 
betting. We construct two separate variables,  ij up Pla _ and ij down Pla _ , that provide a quantitative 
measure of how much a horse i has improved or worsened its finishing position with respect to the 
expectations. Analytically, we define the variables  ij up Pla _ and  ij down Pla _  as follows:   
4   ij ij ij NFP if NFP pla  
4 0   ij ij NFP if pla  
1    ij ij ij pla pla delpla  
0 _ 1     ij ij ij ij pla pla if delpla up Pla   
0 _ 1     ij ij ij ij pla pla if delpla down Pla  
The main idea behind these indicators is that only “meaningful” changes in expectations will 
affect  betting  prices.  Thus,  according  to  the  definitions  of  ij up Pla _ and  ij down Pla _ ,  meaningful 
changes in performance relate to differences in finishing position in successive starts as between first, 
second, third and unplaced
14. Therefore, a horse that run 8
th in one race and 6
th at its next start will 
register no change, even though it has improved its finishing position, but it will register a change if it 
finishes anywhere in the first three places. In other words, the shift from finishing in two different 
position neither of which is at least third is unlikely to impact meaningfully on a win bettor's regret or 
elation, where these changes were anticipated. On the other hand, a horse expected to win which runs 
second can be a source of considerable regret! While a horse that was considered only likely to run a 
place provides both profit and elation if it wins! Note that adaptive expectations are, by definition, 
implicitly assumed, since bettors compare NFPij in this race with NFPij-1 in the previous race (in which 
horse i took part). This assumption can be motivated in light of the typical behaviour of the bettor, who 
does not look too far into the past. In particular, in Hong Kong there are usually only two race meetings 
per week during the racing season (typically one for each track), and more importantly, the mean 
number  of  days  between  race  starts  for  the  horses  in  the  data  set  is  36.  This  allows  us  to  focus 
exclusively on comparison with a horse’s performance at its previous start.  
We investigate the presence of an asymmetric impact on prices of a gain or a loss defined with 
respect to expected win, as measured by a change in horse’s final position as between the forthcoming 
race and the horse’s last start as defined above. We use ordinary least squares and control for a number 
of factors affecting race conditions, such as the barrier (a particularly important variable as between the 
two tracks, as noted above), distance of the race, turf (or dirt) track surface and the weight carried by 
the horse. We control for the specific track by inserting a dummy for the track Happy Valley and 
interacting the dummy with both  ij up Pla _ and ij down Pla _ . We run the regression on each of the three 
sets of prices available in order to detect the loss aversion attitude of different types of agent. We run 
the models twice: once without fixed effects and once with interaction dummies between the horses 
and the jockeys
15. 
                                                 
14 Or "did not show" in American terminology. 
15 Simple OLS with other fixed effects and interaction models were also run (not reported here) with similar results.   11 
The results are reported in Table IVa for the case without fixed effects and in Table IVb for 





                                                                         Table IVa 




Variables  Overnight bettors 
Betting 5 minutes 
before race start 
 
Betting at the close 
 






























Turf  -.0054565*** 
 (.0012417)  
- .0058753*** 
 (.0013116)  
-.00623*** 
(.0013656)  
Barrier  -.0030746*** 
 (.0000949)  
- .003403***    
(.0001002)  
-.0035826*** 
 (.0001043)  
Wt  .0027932*** 
 (.0000612)  
.0035549*** 
 (.0000647)  
.0032675*** 
 (.0000674)  






Observations  51,186  51,186  51,186 
Adjusted R
2  44539   43599   44531  
Table IVa: Dependent variable: The relevant prices.  Robust standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. 
***- The coefficient is significant at the 1% level 






Regression results: The presence of Loss Aversion and different types of bettors: the fixed effect case 
 
 
Variables  Overnight bettors 
Horse-jockey 
interactions 
Betting 5 minutes 






































Turf  -.0121525*** 
 (.0011645)  
- .0141276*** 
 (.0011957)  
-.0147886*** 
 (.0012392)  
Barrier  -.0032932*** 
 (.0000991)  
- .0036856***    
(.0001041)  
-.0038916*** 
 (.000109)  
Wt  .0016021*** 
 (.0000734)  
.0022956*** 
 (.0000776)  
.0018781*** 
 (.0000797)  






Observations  51,186  51,186  51,186 
Adjusted R
2  43531   34591   345.9  
Table IVb: Dependent variable: The final prices on each run.  Robust standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. 
*** The coefficient is significant at the 1% level.    13 
Loss Aversion (defined with respect to expectations of winning) appears to be present in bets in 
all set of regressions, at all three time slices, and at both tracks, Sha Tin and Happy Valley. In Tables 
IVa and IVb we measure loss aversion in the reaction of outsiders (overnight price), outsiders plus 
insiders (price 5 minutes before the race) and professional late bettors added to the other bettors (final 
price).  
Consider the presence of loss aversion in the regression on final prices (reported in summary 
form from Table IVb in the third row of Table V):  l  ˆ 16 is significantly higher in absolute value than 
g  ˆ  at both tracks, Happy Valley and Sha Tin: in both sets of regressions a positive “surprise” in a 
horse’s final position increases the price by a lower amount than the price reduction caused by a same-
sized loss measured in terms of worsening final position of the horse with respect to previous race. The 
set of coefficients  l  ˆ  and  g  ˆ  is significantly different at both tracks (as can be seen through an F-test 
on the equivalence restriction l g   ˆ ˆ   ). Loss aversion affects final prices at both tracks Happy Valley 
and Sha Tin. Moreover, at Happy Valley – where it is more difficult to predict the winner of the race - 
bettors show a lower level of loss aversion, since  l  ˆ (=0.0429) is about 2 times the value of 
g  ˆ (=0.019), while at Sha Tin,  l  ˆ (=0.035) is about 3.5 times  g  ˆ (=0.0098). Therefore, the intensity of 
loss aversion is lower at the more difficult track with respect to the (by consensus) “easier” track. This 
latter result may suggest the role of learning effects on shaping the loss aversion bias: in a more 
difficult environment – as at Happy Valley - the degree of loss aversion tends to be lower since it is 
more difficult to learn – because there are fewer possibilities to improve the capacity to forecast the 
race winner, the bettor cannot be disappointed by her own mistakes. By contrast, at Sha Tin, the 
presence of a learning effect may increase the intensity of loss aversion, since each bettor can more 
readily improve his ability to bet on the winning horse. As shown in Table V, bettors at Sha Tin display 
a higher level of loss aversion than at Happy Valley, confirming the presence of learning effects.  
Further, these results allow us to focus on the behaviour of “smart money”, represented by insiders 
(whose major impact is seen in the prices 5 minutes before the race start) and professional bettors (who 
are known to bet right before the close). The main result is that even insiders and professional bettors, 
like outsiders who are not trained to bet and have no informational advantage, exhibit loss aversion,. 
This provides new evidence of the presence of loss aversion in a particular context: supporting the idea 
that loss aversion is a basic behavioural bias affecting trained and untrained bettors. This result is 
consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Chen et al (2007) – which shows that loss aversion 
is present in the trading behaviour of capuchin monkeys as an innate attitude. 
  However, the intensity of loss aversion is not homogenous across types of bettors: both at Sha 
Tin and Happy Valley professional traders (with late bets) exhibit a lower level of loss aversion, while 
in case of insiders we can observe different patterns: at Happy Valley (in absence of a learning effect) 
trained bettors exhibit a lower level of loss aversion, while insiders at Sha Tin (with its learning effect) 
display an increased the level of LA, which becomes 4 times the coefficient in the case of gain.  Note 
that since the extent of loss aversion does not fall monotonically between the overnight odds and the 




                                                 
16  l  is negative since  ij down pla_  is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1when a horse worsens its NFP. 




Table V: Loss Aversion in the three time slices at Sha Tin and Happy Valley.  
Summary of results of Table IV 
  NIT AHS   TUUA VTPPPA H  
 
















TVPISHEIA   199 5   1193 5   453   144 5   149 5   9593  
5HS FPBTIP.       143 5   1194 5   353   139 5   14. 5   953  






In this paper we have presented a simple theoretical model of regret and elation in a betting 
market. We have shown that our Hong Kong horse betting market data set may be divided into three 
sets of prices which incorporate significantly different kinds of information. We used this finding to 
show that neither amateur outsiders, who bet on the day before the race, nor insiders or sophisticated 
outsiders, bet with a statistically significant favourite-longshot basis. We then used  our theoretical 
model to perform a direct test for the presence of loss aversion in this market and found that, indeed, 
every type of bettor appeared to be beset by loss aversion. The absence of a favourite-longshot bias not 
only in final prices, as in the standard literature on the favourite-longshot bias, but also for overnight 
prices and prices five minutes before the start of the race, in the presence of loss aversion at each stage, 
suggests  that  the  favourite-longshot  bias  may  not  be  psychologically  based.  Moreover,  the  results 
provide additional evidence supporting the idea that loss aversion is innate, as in Chen et al. (2006). 
Finally, we have investigated how widespread loss aversion is across different types of bettors and have 
shown that more sophisticated and experienced bettors display a higher level of loss aversion than 
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